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Abstract n agents located along a river generate residues that then require cleaning
to return the river to its natural state, which entails some cost.We propose several rules
to distribute the total pollutant-cleaning cost among all the agents. We provide axiom-
atic characterizations using properties based on water taxes. Moreover, we prove that
one of the rules coincides with the weighted Shapley value of a game associated with
the problem.
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JEL Classification C71 · D61
1 Introduction
The aggravating situation of environmental contamination over the past few years is an
important reason for countries to impose taxes on the emission of polluting substances
that damage the environment and resources. In Spain, for instance, water and sanita-
tion charges constitute the most representative environmental taxes, these being used
by more than two thirds of the governments of the autonomous regions. Sanitation
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charges are mainly a tax instrument used for funding public sewage treatment services
(Gago et al. 2006).
An important development in this area is the European Union Water Framework
Directive (formally known asDirective 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 23October 2000, establishing a framework for Community action in the
field of water policy). It is a EuropeanUnion directive which commits EuropeanUnion
Member States to achieve good qualitative and quantitative status of all water bodies
by 2015. This Directive establishes the “polluter-pays” principle, which requires that
users pay according to the costs they generate, and determines that Member States
will adopt the recovery of costs of water services principle, including environmental
and resource costs (see Article 9.1.: recovery of costs for water services).
As such integrated policies among the States of the European Union clarify the link
between water use and water pollution, these policies are likely to be more efficient
in meeting water management objectives. For example, the costs of cleaning water
downstream before it is supplied can be compared with the costs of discouraging pol-
lution upstream. Integrated policies also facilitate cost recovery (OECD 2004). When
river-basin authorities have access to the cost of treatment of water supply operators,
this provides a wealth of information on the costs of upstream pollution, which can be
used to estimate the rates at which the release of pollutants should be charged. River-
basin management also facilitates water allocation among competing uses within the
basin as well as the control of inter-basin transfers. In Spain, river-basin authorities
are purchasing water rights for over-exploited water bodies (OECD 2008).
The Communication “Pricing policies for enhancing the sustainability of water
resources”, from the European Commission to the Council, the European Parliament
and the Economic and Social Committee, states that: “A price directly linked to the
water quantities used or pollution produced can ensure that pricing has a clear incentive
function for consumers to improve water use efficiency and reduce pollution”.
This being the case, the use of economic instruments (taxes, duties, financial assis-
tance, negotiable permits) has gained increasing importance and was fully legitimized
in the United Nations’ Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development in 1992.
The central environmental role played by economic instruments is also recognized at
Community level. Furthermore, as we have pointed out, the framework Directive on
water advocates a boosting of the part played by pricing to improve the sustainability
of water resources.
Given the importance of the task of solving water resource management problems,
such as the control of water pollution, the problem of sharing the cleaning costs among
all the polluters should be studied formally.
Ni and Wang (2007) developed a theoretical model to study how to allocate pol-
lutant-cleaning costs among the agents that caused this pollution. They consider a
river which is divided into n segments from upstream to downstream. In each segment
there is an agent who discharges pollutant substances of some kind into the river. The
authorities guarantee the cleansing of the water for public use. The authors propose
two rules to divide the total river-polluting responsibility among the polluters, the local
responsibility sharing (LRS) rule, which charges the agent in a given segment its own
local costs, and the upstream equal sharing (UES) rule, which charges an agent the
sum of the equal divisions of all downstream costs, including its own local costs.
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Littlechild and Owen (1973) studied the airport problem. From a mathematical per-
spective both models are the same because they both have an order of agents and a
cost associated with each agent.
We follow the model of Ni and Wang (2007). We propose several ways to define
water taxes mainly following the “polluter-pays” principle, which takes into account
the different factors that influence the quality of the water. Assuming that the authority
knows for sure the agent responsible for the pollution generated in a particular area,
then the agent should be charged with the total cost of cleaning that area. However, in
most real-life situations, it is not possible to know exactly who is responsible for the
pollution generated in each particular area. This fact will be considered throughout
the paper.
One of the most important topics in the cost sharing literature is the axiomatic char-
acterization of rules. The idea is to propose desirable properties and determine which
of these characterize every rule. Properties often help agents compare different rules
and decide which one is preferred for a particular situation. Following this approach
Ni and Wang (2007) characterize both rules with different properties. In particular,
they prove that the UES rule is the only one satisfying Efficiency, Additivity, Inde-
pendence of Upstream Costs (ensuring that no agent is responsible for the pollution
caused in the upstream segments) and Upstream Symmetry (which states that for any
given downstream cost, all upstream polluters share it equally).
Efficiency and Independence of Upstream Costs are very appealing properties. The
European UnionWater Framework Directive notes that the objectives of water pricing
policies include the full recovery of financial costs, this being established under the
property of Efficiency. As stated before, one of the main objectives of charging water
use is to reduce pollution. Following Ni and Wang (2007) we implicitly assume that
agents pollute the river during some period of time and this pollution must be cleaned.
However, we are not able to knowwho is responsible for the particular pollution being
generated at each segment. If we were, we would simply charge agents the cleaning
cost they are responsible for. In our model, we only know the cost associated with
cleaning each area. Given the direction of the water body, the water transfers the pol-
lution from upstream to downstream. Hence, agents are partially responsible for the
pollution costs downstream but not those upstream. The property of Independence of
Upstream Costs reflects this fact. A property of Independence of Downstream Costs
could make sense in some other situations like when you want to assure that the only
pollution found at one area was generated only in that area.
Additivity is a standard property in the literature. Mathematically, it is an appealing
property because if a rule is additive, then we only need to be concerned with minor
problems, usually easier to solve. Moreover, the Additivity axiom has a clear meaning
in this context. Assuming that to clean each area different technologies, with associ-
ated costs, may be needed, then, the cost of cleaning each area will be the sum of the
costs of using each technology in that area. So, it seems reasonable that the amount
that an agent should pay to clean any area of the river is equal to the sum of the shares
that the agent should pay to use each technology.
Focusing on a real-life situation, the Communication from the Commission to the
Council, European Parliament and Economic and Social Committee: Pricing and sus-
tainable management of water resources, COM (2000) 477, reports that: “The overall
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price P paid by a given user can be computed as F + a.Q + b.Y, with F: an element
related to fixed costs, general taxes, etc.; a: a charge per unit of water used; b: a charge
per unit of pollution produced; Q: the total quantity of water used; Y: the total pollution
produced. A reduction in the quantity of water used (Q) and/or the pollution produced
(Y) will then lead to a reduction in the overall water price P paid by the user. Thus, it
provides an incentive for users to increase water use efficiency and reduce pollution.”
Therefore, it is clear that the assumption that a tax should be additive is quite
reasonable in our context.
With respect to the property of Upstream Symmetry, as we will explain further
on in the paper, many situations exist where this axiom cannot be applied. The main
objective of this paper is to change Upstream Symmetry and use other more suitable
properties. Thus, we will obtain rules applicable to these situations.
Our first result is a characterization of the set of rules satisfying Efficiency, Addi-
tivity and Independence of Upstream Costs. Later on, three more characterizations are
provided by adding in each case a different property to those in the first result.
To define the first property we take into account that in many cases all the agents
dump the same kind of residues into the water. Moreover, all the residues are biode-
gradable, hence, they decompose into natural chemical elements through the action of
biological processes involving light, air, water, bacteria, plants or animals. In this case,
pollution disappears with time. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that the further
away the area is from agent i, the smaller the part of the cost that agent i should pay
for cleaning this area. This is the statement of Upstream Monotonicity.
The second property follows from the fact that on several occasions when the res-
idues are biodegradable, it is possible to know their biodegradation rate, that is, the
rate of deterioration of materials in question under normal, natural conditions, say δ.
Hence, the cost that an agent pays for a polluted area should depend on this biodegrada-
tion rate. In many countries, for instance, Belgium, Finland and South Africa, among
others, water taxes depend on the quality of pollution (OECD2006). Away tomeasure
the quality of pollution could be through the biodegradation rate: the smaller the rate
is, the less hazardous the pollution, as it disappears quicker, and hence, produces less
responsibility for agents downstream. This is the idea of δ−Biodegradation Rate.
Themotivation of the third property is that in many countries there are several alter-
natives in the design of water tax rates. There is a variable component which depends
on different factors, such as, volume of water consumed, pollution load, population
of the municipality, type of residue, etc. This is the case of Austria, Canada, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Korea, Spain, Sweden, USA, among many
others (Gago et al. 2005, 2006; OECD 2006). Thus, the amount paid by each agent
depends proportionally on such a factor, for instance, the pollution load. This idea is
collected within the property of Proportional Tax.
Ni and Wang (2007) prove that the UES rule coincides with the Shapley value
(Shapley 1953b) of a cooperative game c′ where the value of a coalition S represents
the pollutant-cleaning costs of all segments for which agents in S are partially respon-
sible, namely, the segments that are downstream of some agent in S. In this paper
we introduce another cooperative game c where the value of a coalition S represents
the pollutant-cleaning costs of segments for which only agents in S are responsible,
i.e., the segments polluted only by agents belonging to this coalition. We prove that
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the rule characterized by using Proportional Tax coincides with the weighted Shapley
value (Shapley 1953a; Kalai and Samet 1987) of the game c.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and the main
axioms. Section 3 presents the characterization results for different rules. We also
prove that one of the rules coincides with the weighted Shapley value of a particular
cooperative game. The concluding remarks and a comparison of the axiomatized rules
are presented in Sect. 4 while the proofs appear in the Appendix.
2 The mathematical model
The model presented by Ni and Wang (2007) was followed.
Consider a river which is divided into n segments indexed in a given order i =
1, 2, . . . , n from upstream to downstream. There are n agents (for instance, firms)
located along the river, each located in one of these segments in the above order. We
assume that each firm generates a certain amount of pollutants.
In every segment i(i = 1, . . . , n) an environmental authority sets a standard of the
degree of pollutants in segment i so that the quality of the water body satisfies the
environmental standard.
In this problem we try to find rules that allocate the total costs of cleaning the
pollution among all the firms generating this pollution.
Formally, let N = {1, 2, . . .} be the set of all possible agents. Let N ⊂ N be a
finite set of agents. Usually we take N = {1, . . . , n}. Let C = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Rn+ be
the pollutant-cleaning cost vector, where ci represents the cost incurred by agent i. (ci
also captures the costs of using a particular technology for cleaning the segment i).
A pollution cost sharing problem is a pair (N , C). When N is fixed the problem is
denoted as C.
A solution to a problem (N , C) is a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn+ such that∑
i∈N xi =
∑
i∈N ci , where xi represents the cost share assigned to agent i.
A rule is a mapping x that assigns to each problem (N , C) a solution x(N , C).






A rule is efficient if it distributes the total cost of cleaning the pollution.
Additivity (Add) For any C1 = (c11, . . . , c1n) ∈ Rn+ and C2 = (c21, . . . , c2n) ∈ Rn+ we
have
xi (C
1 + C2) = xi (C1) + xi (C2)
for each i ∈ N , where C1 + C2 = (c1i + c2i )i∈N .
Additivity indicates that dividing the total cost among agents is the same as dividing
one part of the cost first and then dividing the remaining cost.
Independence of upstream costs (IUC) Let l ∈ N and C, C ′ ∈ Rn+ such that ci = c′i
for all i > l. Then,
xi (C) = xi (C ′)
for each i > l.
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The cost paid by an agent only depends on its own pollution cost and all downstream
costs, but not on upstream costs for which it has no control or responsibility for.
3 Main results
Ni and Wang (2007) characterized the UES rule using four axioms: Additivity, Effi-
ciency, Independence of Upstream Costs and Upstream Symmetry. The last one
ensures that all the upstream agents have equal responsibility for a given downstream
pollution cost. However, situations exist where this axiom does not apply. For instance,
in some regions of Spain like Valencia and Catalonia, for water taxes applicable to
households, the population size of each municipality where the house is located is
taken into account. In this case, it is not possible to assume that all upstream agents
are symmetric agents due to the pollution caused.
Now, we present the family of rules satisfying Add, Eff and IUC. These rules divide
the cost of cleaning each segment among the agents responsible for the pollution at that
segment, proportionally to aweight vector. For a particular area, the agents responsible
for this pollution are those located upstream.
Theorem 1 A rule x satisfies Eff, Add and IUC if and only if for each j = 1, . . . , n













p ji c j
for all C ∈ Rn+ and all i ∈ N .
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
An example of the family of rules characterized in Theorem 1 is presented:
Example E1 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, and ci = 1 for all i ∈ N . Consider that the propor-
tions that agent 1 should pay for each of the costs are the following: p11 = 1, p21 =
0.3, p31 = 0.5; the proportions of agent 2: p12 = 0, p22 = 0.7, p32 = 0.3 and those of
agent 3 are given by: p13 = 0, p23 = 0, p33 = 0.2. In that case, the rule introduced in
Theorem 1 gives the following assignments:
x1(N , C) = p11c1 + p21c2 + p31c3 = 1.8
x2(N , C) = p12c1 + p22c2 + p32c3 = 1
x3(N , C) = p13c1 + p23c2 + p33c3 = 0.2
Next we study what happens if we add new properties to those in Theorem 1. These
properties are based on possible and real-life taxes over pollution.
Assume that the agents dump the same kind of residues into the water. Moreover,
these residues are biodegradable, so the pollution disappears with time. Several biode-
gradable residues exist, for instance, organic foodwaste, garden waste, forest residues,
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some industrial waste, etc. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the further
away the area is from agent i, the smaller the part of the cost that agent i should pay
for cleaning this area.
A new property in this context is introduced:
Upstream monotonicity (UM) Given j ∈ N , for any i, k ∈ N such that i < k ≤ j
xi (0, . . . , 0, c j , 0, . . . 0) ≤ xk(0, . . . , 0, c j , 0, . . . 0).
This property states that the further away the agent is from an area, the less respon-
sibility the agent has for the pollution of that area.
In the next theorem we study what happens if we add UM to the properties in
Theorem 1. The family of rules that we characterize shares the cost of cleaning each
polluted area among all the agents responsible for this pollution, proportionally to a
vector of weights. These weights satisfy that the further away the responsible agent is
from an area, the lower the proportion of the cost that the agent has to pay.
Theorem 2 A rule x satisfies Add, Eff, IUC and UM if and only if for each j = 1, . . . , n




i∈N ∈ Rn+ such that p ji = 0 when i > j, p ji ≤ p jk




i c j for all C ∈ Rn+ and all
i ∈ N .
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Now an example of the rules introduced in Theorem 2 is presented:
Example E2 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, and ci = 1 for all i ∈ N . Consider that the propor-
tions that agent 1 should pay for each of the costs are the following: p11 = 1, p21 =
0.3, p31 = 0.2; the proportions of agent 2: p12 = 0, p22 = 0.7, p32 = 0.3 and those of
agent 3: p13 = 0, p23 = 0, p33 = 0.5. In this case, the rule introduced in Theorem 2
assigns the following:
x1(N , C) = p11c1 + p21c2 + p31c3 = 1.5
x2(N , C) = p12c1 + p22c2 + p32c3 = 1
x3(N , C) = p13c1 + p23c2 + p33c3 = 0.5
Note that the weight system given in Example E1 is not valid in this context because
it does not satisfy the condition: p ji ≤ p jk for any i < k ≤ j.
Sometimes, when the agents dump biodegradation residues, it is possible to know
their biodegradation rate, say δ. Articles on the computation of biodegradation rate of a
particular residue are numerous.We now introduce a new property, δ−Biodegradation
Rate, which ensures that the taxes paid by agents depend on this rate.
δ-Biodegradation rate (δ -BR) Let δ ∈ [0, 1]. Given j ∈ N , for any i ∈ N such that
i < j,
xi (0, . . . , 0, c j , 0, . . . 0) = δ j−i x j (0, . . . , 0, c j , 0, . . . 0).
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Note that δ = 0 means that the residue of agent i only affects its own area. In this
case BR indicates that every agent pays the cost corresponding to its area, namely
xi (C) = ci for all C and i ∈ N . Additionally, δ = 1 means that the residue is not
biodegradable at all. In this case δ-BR coincides with Upstream Symmetry.
δ-BR is stronger than UM (if a rule x satisfies δ-BR, it also satisfies UM).
In the next theorem we study the effects of adding δ-BR to the properties in Theo-
rem 1. We prove that there is a unique rule satisfying these properties. This rule shares
the cost of cleaning each segment among the agents responsible for this pollution with
respect to a particular vector of weights, such that the proportion that each agent pays
for cleaning a particular area takes into account the biodegradation rate of the residue
thrown into the water.
Theorem 3 A rule x satisfies Add, Eff, IUC and δ-BR if and only if for each
j = 1, . . . , n there exists a weight system (p ji
)
i∈N ∈ Rn+ such that p ji = 0 when








i c j for
all C ∈ Rn+ and all i ∈ N .
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Note that the rule characterized in Theorem 3 belongs to the family of rules char-
acterized in Theorem 1.
An example of this rule is presented.
Example E3 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, and ci = 1 for all i ∈ N . Assume that the biodeg-
radation rate of the residue is δ = 0.1. Now, we deduce the proportions of costs that
agents should pay for each area.
By Theorem 3, we have that p21 = δp22 and p11 + p12 = 1, therefore, p22 = 11.1 =
0.909 and p21 = 0.0909. Moreover, p31 = δ2 p33, p31 = δp32, p32 = δp33 and p31 + p32 +
p33 = 1. Then, we can deduce that p31 = 0.00909, p32 = 0.09 and p33 = 0.9090. Now
we can compute the allocation given by the rule introduced in Theorem 3:
x1(N , C) = p11c1 + p21c2 + p31c3 = 1.1089
x2(N , C) = p12c1 + p22c2 + p32c3 = 0.999
x3(N , C) = p13c1 + p23c2 + p33c3 = 0.9090
In many countries, the water taxes are modulated considering different factors such
as pollution load, population of the cities, monthly water consumption, etc. (see Gago
et al. 2006; OECD 2006). These ideas are captured by the following axiom:
Proportional tax with respect to w (PT-w) Let w = (wi )i∈N ∈ RN++. Given i, j, k ∈
N such that i < k ≤ j,
xi (0, . . . , 0, c j , 0, . . . , 0)




This property states that the amount that each agent pays for a polluted area is given
by some factorw. For instance,wi could represent the population of themunicipality.
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PT−w generalizes Upstream Symmetry because when wi = w j for all i, j ∈ N
both properties coincide.
In the next theorem we study the effects of adding this property to the properties in
Theorem 1. For each w ∈ RN++ we prove that there is a unique rule satisfying these
properties. This rule, as well as the ones introduced in the previous Theorems, also
distributes the cost of cleaning each segment proportionally among all the agents that
are responsible for this pollution. However, unlike the others, in this rule, the propor-
tion that each agent pays for cleaning each area considers an exogenous factor that is
fixed for each agent. This weight is applied to distribute the cost of cleaning each area
the agent is responsible for polluting, whether directly or from the agent’s pollution
traveling downstream to other areas. For instance, if the agents represent firms, the
weight could be as a function of their size, such that the bigger the firm, the higher the
weight assigned.
Theorem 4 A rule x satisfies Add, Eff, IUC and PT-w if and only if for each j =




i∈N ∈ Rn+ such that p ji = 0 when i >
j, p ji = wi∑ j
l=1 wl




i c j for all C ∈ Rn+
and all i ∈ N .
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Note that the rule characterized in Theorem 4 belongs to the family of rules char-
acterized in Theorem 1.
Example E4 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, and ci = 1 for all i ∈ N . Assume that the weight
system is given by: ω1 = 0.25, ω2 = 0.5, and ω3 = 0.25.
To compute the proportions of costs that agents should pay for each area, the condi-
tion given in Theorem 4 is taken into account, and therefore, we deduce that those pro-
portions for agent 1 are: p11 = ω1ω1 = 1; p21 = ω1ω1+ω2  0.34, p31 = ω1ω1+ω2+ω3 = 0.25;
for agent 2: p12 = 0, p22 = ω2ω1+ω2  0.67, p32 = ω2ω1+ω2+ω3 = 0.5; and for agent 3:
p13 = p23 = 0, p33 = ω3ω1+ω2+ω3 = 0.25.
Then, the final assignment is:
x1(N , C) = p11c1 + p21c2 + p31c3  1.6
x2(N , C) = p12c1 + p22c2 + p32c3  1.15
x3(N , C) = p13c1 + p23c2 + p33c3 = 0.25
Remark As observed, Theorem 4 proposed taxes that are linear-wise with respect to
the weight system. Several real examples show this. For instance, in Spain, in the
autonomous region of Galicia, both the taxes for industrial and domestic uses have a
variable component that is linear with respect to aspects such as water consumption,
volume of residues, etc. (see Law 14/2006). This is also observed in Navarra (Law
Foral 17/2006), La Rioja (Law 11/2006), Catalonia (Law 16/2003), Aragon (Law
18/2006), Asturias (Law 11/2006), among others. For more information, see OECD
(2010).
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Below, the rule characterized in Theorem 4 is related to a well-known solution in
transferable utility games. Before presenting the result, some notation:
A transferable utility game, T U game, is a pair (N , c) where N ⊂ N is finite and
c : 2N → R satisfies c(∅) = 0.
Given a finite subset N ⊂ N , let (N ) denote the set of all orders in N . Given
π ∈ (N ), let Pre(i, π) denote the set of elements of N which come before i in the
order given by π, i.e.,
Pre(i, π) = { j ∈ N : π( j) < π(i)}.
One of the most important values in TU games is the weighted Shapley value
(Shapley 1953a). Given a vector of weights w ∈ RN++, we denote the weighted Shap-
ley value with weights given by w as φwi (N , c). It can be expressed (Kalai and Samet
1987) as:
φwi (N , c) :=
∑
π∈(N )
pω(π)[c(Pre(i, π) ∪ i) − c(Pre(i, π))] for all i ∈ N
where pω(π) = ∏|N |j=1 ωπ( j)∑ j
k=1 ωπ(k)
.
Ni and Wang (2007) prove that the solution they propose is related to some natural
T U games they introduce. In particular, the Upstream Equal Sharing rule coincides




, where c′ (S) =∑n
i=min S ci for all S ⊂ N . Namely c′ (S) represents the pollutant-cleaning costs in
the downstream segments of some agent of S.
We now relate the solutions given by Theorem 4 with the weighted Shapley values
of another T U game. First we introduce the following TU game:






for all S ⊂ N . Namely c (S) represents the pollutant-cleaning costs in the segments
polluted only by agents in S.
Wenowcompare the game c′ ofNi andWang (2007)with our game c. c′ (S) takes the
pessimistic approach for coalition S and computes the cost of all segments for which
agents in S are partially responsible for, namely, the segments that are downstream
of some agent in S. In this case, if segment i is downstream of agent j ∈ S, agent j
is responsible for part of the pollution in segment i (note that we are assuming that
the water could move the pollution from one segment to another). Nevertheless, c (S)
takes an optimistic approach for coalition S and computes the cost of the segments
for which only agents in S are responsible for. Since we are assuming that pollution
could move from one segment to any downstream segment, the pollution of segment
i is caused by all its upstream agents (namely, agents in {1, . . . , i}). Thus, agents in S
are responsible only for the pollution in segment i if and only if {1, . . . , i} ⊂ S. It is
trivial to see that c (S) ≤ c′ (S) for each S ⊂ N .
To clarify the idea of the game c, consider the following example:
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Example E5 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and ci = 1 for all i ∈ N . We will compute c(S) for
all S ⊂ N . Let S = {1}, since segment 1 is polluted only by agent 1 and S = {1},
we have that c ({1}) = c1 = 1. Consider now S = {2}. The pollution of segment 2 is
responsibility not only for agent 2, but also for agent 1, and since 1 ∈ S, c ({2}) = 0.
Similarly, we conclude that c ({3}) = 0.
Consider S = {1, 2}. Segments 1 and 2 are polluted only by agents 1 and 2, since
both belong to S, c ({1, 2}) = c1 + c2 = 2. Let S = {1, 3}, now, segment 1 is polluted
only by agent 1,who belongs to S, but segment 3 is polluted by agents 1, 2 and 3. Since
2 ∈ S, we do not take into account c2 to compute c({1, 3}), then, c ({1, 3}) = c1 = 1.
For S = {2, 3},we have that agent 1 is also responsible for the pollution in segments 2
and 3, and since 1 does not belong to S, then c ({2, 3}) = 0. Using similar arguments,
we obtain that c (N ) = c1 + c2 + c3 = 3.
In the following table we summarize the results and we compare them with the
ones given by c′:
S c′(S) c(S)
{1} c1 + c2 + c3 = 3 c1 = 1
{2} c2 + c3 = 2 0
{3} c3 = 1 0
{1, 2} c1 + c2 + c3 = 3 c1 + c2 = 2
{1, 3} c1 + c2 + c3 = 3 c1 = 1
{2, 3} c2 + c3 = 2 0
N c1 + c2 + c3 = 3 c1 + c2 + c3 = 3
Theorem 5 Let xw be the solution given by Theorem 4. Then, xw coincides with the
weighted Shapley value of (N , c) with weights given by w ∈ RN++, φw (N , c).
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
The Upstream Equal Sharing rule coincides with the rule given by Theorem 4
when wi = wk for all i, k ∈ N . By Theorem 5 the Upstream Equal Sharing rule also
coincides with the Shapley value of the T U game c.
4 Concluding remarks
The important task of solving water resource management problems such as the con-
trol of water pollution is addressed in this work. It then seems reasonable to study the
problem of sharing the cleaning costs among all the polluters in a formal way, this
being one of the aims of our model. We simplify the situation by considering a river,
divided into many segments, as many polluters are along the river. These polluters
may represent a town, a firm, a household, a region or even a country, depending on
the particular situation studied. We propose several ways to define water taxes, mainly
following the “polluter-pays” principle, which takes into account different factors that
influence the quality of the water. Assuming that an environmental authority knows
exactly who the agent responsible for the pollution generated in a particular area is,
then the agent should be charged with the total cost of cleaning that area, however,
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in most real-life situations, this is not possible. Thus, we propose several rules that
reduce the incentive for agents to cause pollution, which is the main objective of water
taxes in most countries.
In this paper we characterize several rules that have a common structure: all pro-
portionally distribute the cost of cleaning each area among all the agents that are
responsible for this pollution. However, the weights assigned to the agents are differ-
ent in each case.
In Theorem 1, we characterize a family of rules that distribute the costs with respect
to a general vector of weights, such that the cost of a particular area is totally shared
among all the agents that are responsible for the pollution present in that segment, i.e.,
the agents located upstream.
In Theorem 2, the family of rules characterized distributes the costs with respect to
a vector of weights that satisfies the following condition: the further away an agent is
from a polluted area (for which it is responsible), the lower the proportion of the cost
of cleaning that area.
The rule characterized in Theorem 3 could be applied when the agents throw the
same kind of residue and it is biodegradable. The biodegradation rate of the residue
represents the amount of pollution that is transferred from one area to the following
ones. There, the weights assigned to each agent depend on the biodegradation rate
of the residue. Therefore, for a specific biodegradation rate, there will be a specific
vector of weights.
The rule characterized in Theorem 4 takes into account a weight system in which
the weight assigned to each agent is fixed a priori. Then, the cost of cleaning each area
is distributed among all the agents responsible for the pollution there, proportionally
to these weights.
Finally, in Theorem 5 we relate the last rule characterized with one of the most
important values in TU games. We prove that this rule coincides with the weighted
Shapley value of a particular game.
5 Appendix
In this section we include the formal proofs of the results presented previously.
Theorem 1 A rule x satisfies Eff, Add and IUC if and only if for each j = 1, . . . , n













p ji c j .
Proof of Theorem 1 Let x be a rule defined as above. We first prove that x satisfies
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x satisfies Add: Let C and C ′ ∈ Rn+ and i ∈ N . Thus,
xi (C + C ′) =
n∑
j=1
x ji (C + C ′) =
n∑
j=1

















= xi (C) + xi (C ′).
x satisfies IUC: Let l ∈ N and C, C ′ ∈ Rn+ such that ci = c′i for all i > l. Let




p ji c j =
n∑
j=i











j = xi (C ′).
We now prove the reciprocal. Assume that x is a solution satisfying Eff, Add and
IUC. For each j ∈ N , let 1 j = (y1, . . . ., yn) ∈ Rn+ such that y j = 1 and yi = 0 when




j∈N is a weight system.




j∈N . We will prove that
x = x p. We first prove two claims following Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004).
Claim 1 Let c j ∈ Q+ (a non-negative rational number), then
xi (0, . . . , c j , . . . , 0) = c j xi (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0).
Proof of Claim 1 Let c j = 1/q, where q ∈ N. By Add, xi (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) =∑q
k=1 xi (0, . . . ,
1
q , . . . , 0) = qxi (0, . . . , 1q , . . . , 0). Thus,
xi
(
0, . . . ,
1
q
, . . . , 0
)
= xi (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0)
q
= c j xi (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0). (1)
Let c j ∈ Q+, say c j = pq .ByAdd, xi
(




0, . . . , 1q , . . . , 0
)
.
Then by (1), xi
(
0, . . . , pq , . . . , 0
)
= pq xi (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0). unionsq
Claim 2 Let c j ∈ R+\Q+ (a non-negative irrational number), then
xi (0, . . . , c j , . . . , 0) = c j xi (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0).
Proof of Claim 2 Let c j ∈ R+\Q+.Then, there exists {bl}∞l=1 such that bl ∈ Q+, bl <
c j and liml→∞ bl = c j .
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Let l ∈ N. Since x(0, . . . , c j − bl , . . . , 0) ∈ Rn+ and
∑
i∈N xi (0, . . . , c j −
bl , . . . , 0) = c j − bl ,
0 ≤ xi (0, . . . , c j − bl , . . . , 0) ≤ c j − bl .
By Add, xi (0, . . . , c j , . . . , 0) = xi (0, . . . , c j − bl , . . . , 0) + xi (0, . . . , bl , . . . , 0).
So,
0 ≤ xi (0, . . . , c j , . . . , 0) − xi (0, . . . , bl , . . . , 0) ≤ c j − bl .
Since bl ∈ Q+, xi (0, . . . , bl , . . . , 0) = bl xi (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0). Then,













0 ≤ xi (0, . . . , c j , . . . , 0) − c j xi (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) ≤ 0.
Therefore,
xi (0, . . . , c j , . . . , 0) = c j xi (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0).
unionsq
Let C = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Rn+. We now prove that xi (C) = x pi (C) for each i ∈ N .














i De f ini tion of p
j
= x pi (C) . Def ini tion of x p.
This finishes the proof of the Theorem. unionsq
Theorem 2 A rule x satisfies Add, Eff, IUC and UM if and only if for each j = 1, . . . , n




i∈N ∈ Rn+ such that p ji = 0 when i > j, p ji ≤ p jk




i c j for all C ∈ Rn+ and all
i ∈ N .
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Proof of Theorem 2 By Theorem 1 the rule x defined as above satisfies Add, Eff, and
IUC. Now we prove that x satisfies UM. Let i, j, k ∈ N such that i < k ≤ j. Let
(0, . . . ., c j , . . . , 0) ∈ Rn+. Then,
xi (0 . . . , c j , . . . , 0) =
n∑
l=1
pli cl = p ji c j




= xk(0 . . . , c j , . . . , 0).
We now prove the reciprocal. Let x be a rule satisfying Add, Eff, IUC and UM. By
Theorem 1 for each j = 1, . . . , n there exists a weight system (p ji
)
i∈N ∈ Rn+ such








i c j for all C ∈ Rn+ and
all i ∈ N . We now prove that p ji ≤ p jk for any i < k ≤ j.
Let i, j, k ∈ N such that i < k ≤ j. By the proof of Theorem 1, p j = x (1 j
)
.







. Thus, p ji ≤ p jk . unionsq
Theorem 3 A rule x satisfies Add, Eff, IUC and δ -BR if and only if for each j =




i∈N ∈ Rn+ such that p ji = 0 when i > j,








i c j for all
C ∈ Rn+ and all i ∈ N .
Proof of Theorem 3 By Theorem 1 the rule x defined as above satisfies Add, Eff, and
IUC.
Now we prove that x satisfies δ-BR. Let i, j, k ∈ N such that i < k ≤ j. Let
(0, . . . ., c j , . . . , 0) ∈ Rn+. Then,
xi (0 . . . , c j , . . . , 0) =
n∑
l=1
pli cl = p ji c j = δ j−i p jj c j
= δk−iδ j−k p jj c j = δk−i p jk c j
= δk−i xk(0 . . . , c j , . . . , 0).
We now prove the reciprocal. Let x be a rule satisfying Add, Eff, IUC and δ-BR.
By Theorem 1 for each j = 1, . . . , n there exists a weight system (p ji
)
i∈N ∈ Rn+ such








i c j for all C ∈ Rn+ and
all i ∈ N . We now prove that p ji = δk−i p jk for any i < k ≤ j.
Let i, j, k ∈ N such that i < k ≤ j. By the proof of Theorem 1, p j = x (1 j
)
.
Since x satisfies δ-BR,
p ji = xi
(
1 j
) = δ j−i x j
(
1 j
) = δk−iδ j−k x j
(
1 j
) = δk−i xk
(
1 j
) = δk−i p jk .
unionsq
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Theorem 4 A rule x satisfies Add, Eff, IUC and PT-w if and only if for each j =




i∈N ∈ Rn+ such that p ji = 0 when i >
j, p ji = wi∑ j
l=1 wl




i c j for all C ∈ Rn+
and all i ∈ N .
Proof of Theorem 4 By Theorem 1 the rule x defined as above satisfies Add, Eff, and
IUC. It is not difficult to prove that x satisfies PT-w.




















































Theorem 5 Let xw be the solution given by Theorem 4. Then, xw coincides with the
weighted Shapley value of (N , c) with weights given by w ∈ RN++, φw (N , c).
Proof of Theorem 5 Let w = (wi )i∈N ∈ RN++.
Let {uS}S⊂N be a family of T U games such that uS (T ) = 1 if S ∩ T = ∅ and
us (T ) = 0 otherwise. It is well known, for instance, in Kalai and Samet (1987), that
{uS}S⊂N is a basis for the set of all T U games.
Kalai and Samet (1987) define the value φw∗ as the unique linear value satisfying
that for each S ⊂ N , φw∗i (uS) = wi∑k∈S wk if i ∈ S and φ
w∗
i (uS) = 0 otherwise.
Besides, they prove that for each w ∈ RN++ and each T U game v, φw∗ (v) = φw (v∗)
where v∗ (S) = v (N ) − v (N\S) for all S ⊂ N .
For each j = 1, . . . , n, let (N , v j ) be the T U game where for all S ⊂ N , v j (S) =
c j if S ∩ {1, . . . , j} = ∅ and v j (S) = 0 otherwise. Note that v j = c j u{1,..., j} for all
j ∈ N .








































Let S ⊂ N . Then, v j∗ (S) = v j (N ) − v j (N\S) = c j − v j (N\S). Since
v j (N\S) = c j when N\S ∩ {1, . . . , j} = ∅ and v j (N\S) = 0 when N\S ∩
{1, . . . , j} = ∅,
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v j∗ (S) =
{
c j if {1, . . . , j} ⊂ S
0 otherwise.
Now it is trivial to prove that for all S ⊂ N , c (S) = ∑nj=1 v j∗ (S). Hence,
xwi (N , C) = φwi (N , c) . unionsq
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